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Abstract. A novel bankruptcy approach is proposed for resolving transboundary river conflicts in which the total water demand or claim of the riparian parties is more than the
available water. Bankruptcy solution methods can allocate
the available water to the conflicting parties with respect to
their claims. Four commonly used bankruptcy methods in
the economic literature are used here to develop new river
bankruptcy solution methods for allocating water to the riparian parties of river systems. Given the non-uniform spatial and temporal distribution of water across river basins, the
proposed solution methods are formulated as non-linear network flow optimization models to allocate water with respect
to time sensitivity of water deliveries at different locations in
a river network during the planning horizon. Once allocation optimization solutions are developed, their acceptability
and stability must be evaluated. Thus, a new bankruptcy allocation stability index (BASI) is developed for evaluating
the acceptability of river bankruptcy solutions. To show how
the proposed river bankruptcy framework can be helpful in
practice, the suggested methods are applied to a real-world
transboundary river system with eight riparians under various
hydrologic regimes. Stability analysis based on the proposed
stability evaluation method suggests that the acceptability of
allocation rules is sensitive to hydrologic conditions and demand values. This finding has an important policy implication suggesting that fixed allocation rules and treaties may
not be reliable for securing cooperation over transboundary
water resources as they are vulnerable to changing socioeconomic and climatic conditions as well as hydrologic nonstationarity.

1

Introduction

Conflicts are integral to managing transboundary rivers due
to the externalities associated with growing demand and development in riparian states. There are 148 riparian countries
creating about 276 transboundary river basins in the world
(De Stefano et al., 2012). These basins cover over 45 % of
the Earth’s land surface and provide about 60 % of the global
river flows (Wolf et al., 2006). To facilitate cooperation over
transboundary rivers, over 400 international agreements were
signed in the 20th century (De Stefano et al., 2012), reflecting a great potential for cooperation over transboundary natural resources (Wolf et al., 2006). However, the stability of
these agreements could be affected by socioeconomic and
political changes in the riparian states as well as climatic
and hydrologic variations. Dinar et al. (2010) reported 112
complaints about water deficit in transboundary river systems during droughts and floods in the 1950–2005 period,
underlying the vulnerability of cooperation over transboundary water systems to abnormal hydrologic conditions.
Game theory – the mathematical study of competition and
cooperation – is a useful method for studying transboundary
river management problems. Both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory methods have been used in the past to
study transboundary water conflicts (Parrachino et al., 2006;
Madani, 2010).
Non-cooperative game theoretic methods are useful in
studying the strategic behaviors of riparian parties, feasibility of cooperative solutions, and providing strategic insights into the conflicts (Madani and Hipel, 2011; Madani,
2013). Example transboundary river conflicts analyzed by
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non-cooperative game theory concepts include the conflict
over flooding of Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers between
India and Pakistan (Rogers, 1969), the lower Mekong river
basin conflict between Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam (Dufournaud, 1982), the Jordan river conflict between
Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria (Madani and
Hipel, 2007), and the Nile river conflict between Burundi,
Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan,
Tanzania, and Uganda (Elimam et al., 2008). These methods normally rely on qualitative information to find the likely
outcomes of conflicts based on various stability definitions,
which incorporate a range of decision makers’ (players’)
characteristics such as risk attitude, foresight level, and information quality (Madani and Hipel, 2011; Madani, 2013).
While these methods provide valuable insights into strategic
conflicts and can help find possible resolutions to the conflict,
their results are not necessarily quantitative and in most cases
are only appropriate for studying as games with discrete solutions (strategies or actions).
Cooperative game theory solution methods normally seek
to allocate the incremental benefits of cooperation (cost savings, added values, etc.) among the cooperating parties. In
the context of transboundary river management, cooperative game theory concepts can be used to develop functional water allocation schemes. Example transboundary
river conflicts analyzed by cooperative game theory include
the Ganges river conflict between Bangladesh and India
(Kilgoure and Dinar, 2001), the Euphrates and Tigris rivers
conflict between Iraq, Syria, and Turkey (Kucukmehmetoglu
and Guldmen, 2004), and the Syr Darya river basin conflict
between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan (Teasley
and McKinney, 2011). Cooperative game theory methods
are appropriate for quantitative problems with a continuous
solution domain.
Different resource allocation methods have been employed
in the water resources literature to increase systems’ efficiency and minimize conflicts. Social welfare maximization
is perhaps the mostly commonly used approach for water
allocation in the literature. Based on this approach, a social (central) planner seeks to maximize the system-wide
benefits assuming there is perfect cooperation among the
water users. The social planner approach pays minimal attention to individual gains and distribution of total benefits
among the beneficiaries, making it less practical (Madani and
Hooshyar, 2014).
Market mechanisms and cooperative game theory schemes
are among the other water allocation methods that are used
to make the social planner’s solution practical. These methods focus on redistribution of the incremental benefits of
cooperation and create win–win allocation solutions that
make cooperation attractive to individual rational beneficiaries (Madani and Hooshyar, 2014). While these methods are
promising, their application is limited to problems in which
utility information is available for all parties and the incremental benefits of cooperation can be determined. ThereHydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 18, 3055–3068, 2014

fore, challenge remains in developing cooperative schemes
for managing shared water systems for which utility information might not be readily available, agreeable, or reliable
(common in transboundary river systems).
Operations research-based allocation methods (Madani et
al., 2014a; Read et al., 2014) have also been employed in
the water resources literature to allocate water. These methods are appropriate for problems with both discrete and continuous solutions and can be applied with and without utility information. However, as shown by Read et al. (2014),
they seek distribution of dissatisfaction in an “optimal” way,
disregarding the stability of allocation solutions. Therefore,
their acceptability is questionable, making them less practical in real world.
Bankruptcy methods (O’Neil, 1982; Aumann and
Maschler, 1985; Dagan and Volij, 1993) comprise another
group of allocation methods used in the water resources
literature for water allocation in the presence and absence of
utility information (Sheikhmohammady and Madani, 2008;
Ansink and Ruijs, 2008; Ansink and Weikard, 2012; Madani
and Zarezadeh, 2012; Mianabadi et al., 2013; Madani and
Dinar, 2013). These methods are promising due to their
cooperative game theoretic nature and their attention to individual gains under different conditions (e.g., homogeneity
of claims). However, as will be discussed in the following
section, the previous applications of bankruptcy methods
do not set an appropriate basis for using these methods
for solving transboundary river allocation problems with
temporal and spatial flow variability.
The objective of this paper is to bridge the gap of previous transboundary conflict resolution studies by developing a new bankruptcy-based water allocation mechanism
that: (1) does not necessarily require the players’ utility information (e.g., economic benefits of each beneficiary from
the allocated water); (2) its application is not limited to problems in which cooperation must result in extra quantifiable
benefits and (3) provides allocations solutions with respect
to the temporal and spatial variability of water flows in transboundary river systems.

2
2.1

River bankruptcy problem
General description

Water conflicts can develop when the yield of a water system
is not sufficient to fully satisfy the demands of all beneficiaries. Such a situation is similar to a bankruptcy state in
which the total assets of an individual/entity are not enough
to fully satisfy their/its debts. In other words, in a bankruptcy
problem the total value of the claims of the beneficiaries is
more than the value of the available resource. Such a similarity between water allocation problems and bankruptcy
problems has been the main motivation for using bankruptcy
methods, rooted in the economics and mathematics literature
www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci.net/18/3055/2014/
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(O’Neil, 1982; Aumann and Maschler, 1985; Dagan and
Volij, 1993) to solve water resources bankruptcy problems
(Sheikhmohammady and Madani, 2008; Ansink and Ruijs,
2008; Sheikhmohammady et al., 2010; Grundel et al., 2011;
Ansink and Weikard, 2012; Madani and Zarezadeh, 2012;
Mianabadi et al., 2013; Madani and Dinar, 2013).
Bankruptcy methods can be categorized as cooperative
game theory solutions (Sheikhmohammady and Madani,
2008). Nevertheless, these methods are different in principle from the commonly used cooperative game theory methods such as Nash–Harsanyi bargaining solution (Harsanyi,
1959), Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), and the nucleolus method (Schmeidler, 1969), among others. While the
bankruptcy methods focus on allocation of the total deficit
(the difference between the total claim and the value of the
available resource) among the parties, commonly used cooperative game theoretic solution methods have been primarily
developed for allocation of the incremental benefits of cooperation among the cooperating parties. Therefore, they are
not readily applicable to the bankruptcy situations with no incremental benefit from cooperation, or to cases in which the
available information about the utilities of the parties from
their resource shares are missing or are not reliable.
In some river basins, developing agreeable utility functions to estimate the utility (e.g., economic gain) of each riparian from its water use is very challenging due to the lack
of trust and information as well as the absence of cooperative
tendencies in the region. Therefore, river sharing games are
often played as zero-sum games in which parties are mainly
bargaining about their volumetric shares from the river, while
in reality, due to the difference in the non-linear utility functions of the parties these games are not zero-sum (Madani,
2011; Madani and Lund, 2012). In fact, the zero-sum perception of the riparian parties is one of the main reasons for
competition rather than cooperation, which makes economically efficient cooperative game theoretic institutions or other
mechanisms such as water trading and markets impractical
and unacceptable. To address these issues, bankruptcy methods can be applied for developing water allocation solutions.
Although bankruptcy methods provide solutions which are
economically less efficient than those provided by common
cooperative game theory methods, they are potentially more
publicly acceptable and practical. Most bankruptcy methods
are based on common sense and are relatively easy to understand by the general public, unfamiliar with the economic
principles and fairness rationales of the mathematically sophisticated cooperative game theory methods. This advantage has been the main reason for the success of some of the
bankruptcy methods in practice since ancient times in different eras and locations. The proportional cutback principle
is an example of one of the oldest bankruptcy methods that
has been widely used for water resources management during droughts in different areas of the world (e.g., qanat water
allocation in the Persian Empire and groundwater allocation
in California.)
www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci.net/18/3055/2014/
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Essential elements

The two essential elements of a bankruptcy problem include
(1) the amount of resource available and (2) the values of
beneficiaries’ claims. In most water resources bankruptcy
problems, the first element simply equals the available water
to be allocated to the beneficiaries in a given location at a specific time. Also, finding the claim values is straightforward
in some water systems (e.g., claims of groundwater users in
the case of groundwater bankruptcy are determined based on
their groundwater rights in a regulated system). Therefore,
bankruptcy solutions have been already used in the literature
for solving water allocation problems with known (predetermined) claims and/or without temporal and spatial variability in resource availability/access (Sheikhmohammady and
Madani, 2008; Ansink and Ruijs, 2008; Sheikhmohammady
et al., 2010; Grundel et al., 2011; Ansink and Weikard, 2012;
Mianabadi et al., 2013; Madani and Dinar, 2013). Nevertheless, solving transboundary river bankruptcy problems with
original bankruptcy methods can be challenging for two reasons: (1) the lack of an acceptable method by all parties to
estimate the credible claims of the beneficiaries and (2) the
temporal and spatial change of the flow along the river basin.
2.3

Claims

Determination of the beneficiaries’ claims in transboundary
water systems is challenging and highly controversial due to
the lack of information, unreliability of parties’ claims and
narratives, and absence of a globally acceptable framework
for determining the credible claims of riparian parties. Thus,
in Sect. 4 this paper suggests three different possible claim
estimation methods for transboundary river bankruptcy problems with potential applications in real-world water conflicts.
2.4

Physical constraints: spatial and temporal
variability

Classical bankruptcy methods assume homogenous resource
accessibility and are appropriate for one-shot allocation
problems. Therefore, they are not necessarily applicable to
problems with temporal and spatial heterogeneity in resource
availability. Due to the change of the flow over time and
space, especially in river systems with multiple tributaries,
water availability might be limited at a given location at a
specific time. Therefore, original bankruptcy methods may
produce infeasible allocation solutions for river systems.
While temporal resource variability has not been considered in previous bankruptcy studies, few studies have tried to
address the spatial variability of resource in bankruptcy problems. Ilkılıç and Kayı (2012) formulated a network (graph)
model for bankruptcy allocation with respect to the possible geographical and infrastructural constraints in distributing the resource among beneficiaries. While their method
satisfies the fairness principle, i.e., “equal treatment of the
Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 18, 3055–3068, 2014
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equals”, it considers “no restrictions on the possible networks between sources and agents” (Ilkılıç and Kayı, 2012).
Therefore, their model is not generally applicable to river
sharing problems in which the physical characteristics of the
resource (river) system impose restrictions on networks between sources (river sections) and agents (riparian parties).
In another study, Ansink and Weikard (2012) proposed a
sequential allocation approach for solving river bankruptcy
problems using classical bankruptcy methods. However, their
method is only applicable to linear river systems with a single tributary, and is based on some assumptions which might
limit its applicability to complex multi-tributary transboundary river systems involving equally powerful parians seeking equal treatment of the equals (Mianabadi et al., 2013;
Zarezadeh et al., 2014).
This paper proposes a new approach for solving transboundary river bankruptcy problems with consideration of
the constraints imposed by the temporal and spatial variability of water flows within river networks. The general characteristics of the proposed method are discussed in the next
section. While transboundary water allocation motivates this
work, the proposed method is applicable to other bankruptcy
problems with temporal and spatial resource availability constraints. Suggested examples of such problems by Ilkılıç and
Kayı (2012) include aid relief during and after disasters, utility (gas, electricity, water) distribution in supply shocks, and
common property fisheries.
2.5

Acceptability

Given that the developed bankruptcy allocation solutions
have no practical value unless they are acceptable and considered to be fair by the beneficiaries, evaluating the acceptability of the developed solutions is essential. Ex post analysis
of the stability of allocation solutions is common in the water resources literature (e.g., Dinar and Howitt, 1997; Teasley
and McKinney, 2011; Madani and Dinar, 2012; Read et al.,
2014; Madani and Hooshyar, 2014). Once different allocation solutions are developed, the stability of solutions is normally evaluated using quantitative measures to determine the
solutions with higher potential acceptability. Alternatively,
an axiomatic (ex ante) approach can be adopted for allocation stability evaluation. Based on this approach, which
is more common in the economics literature, the attractiveness of allocation rules is evaluated based on their properties such as monotonicity or independence properties, with
respect to various possible perturbations of the problem at
hand (Herrero and Villar, 2001; Thomson, 2003).
Ideally, the results of both approaches should coincide and
this needs to be verified by future research. Nevertheless, the
water resources literature tends to commonly use the ex post
approach, finding it more attractive from the practical standpoint. In practice, developing a compromise over an ex ante
approach, before clarifying to the beneficiaries what their
actual gains would be, more challenging unless decision is
Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 18, 3055–3068, 2014

made by an authorized intervener (e.g., social planner, government, or regulator), whose decision is enforceable and acceptable by all parties. In the ex post approach, on the other
hand, multiple allocation solutions with transparent utility information (i.e., volumetric gains in case of river bankruptcy)
can proposed to the negotiators. This expands the feasible
solution set and creates more opportunities for cooperation
through providing “substance” to negotiations (Bruce and
Madani, 2014).
What makes the application of an ex ante approach even
more complex in of river bankruptcy problems is the asymmetric accessibility of the resource (water) at a given time
and location. Therefore, even if the solution properties are
reasonable, the actual solutions (volumetric allocations in
this case) will be affected by the physical limitations of the
system. Thus, the same solution principles might not yield
similar results in two river bankruptcy problems with similar claims and total water availability as the physical aspects
of the system can make the actual allocations different, i.e.,
water might not be available at a given location at a given
time, as desired based on the allocation rule. This makes
the axiomatic approach less practical as it does not guarantee feasible allocation solutions based on a given allocation
rule, failing to provide clear information to the parties about
their actual gains. Therefore, an ex post stability evaluation
method is proposed and used in this study.
While various methods have been used in the literature
to evaluate the stability and acceptability of water allocation solutions (Dinar and Howitt, 1997; Madani and Dinar,
2012; Read et al., 2014), these methods cannot be readily
used to evaluate the acceptability of bankruptcy solutions.
Therefore, a new quantitative stability evaluation method is
developed in this study to evaluate the potential acceptability
of the proposed bankruptcy solutions.
2.6

Robustness

Normally, in water allocation negotiations, the amount of
available water in a given time-step (e.g., month) is determined based on the average historical flow in that time-step.
Given that water flows are different in dry, wet, and normal
years, water allocation agreements can vary depending on the
hydrologic conditions. Water allocation based on historical
flows might make allocation agreements vulnerable to hydrologic variability, uncertainty, and non-stationarity. Therefore, instead of relying on fixed water shares, riparian parties can try to agree over a flexible allocation framework that
adjusts allocation solutions considering the changing conditions of the system. This study seeks to propose a robust
bankruptcy solution framework that can provide water allocation solutions that are not vulnerable to changing conditions and can update allocations accordingly. Therefore, stability of the allocation solution is examined under different
hydrological conditions to determine if allocation rules and
solutions must be changed under different hydrologies or if a
www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci.net/18/3055/2014/
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the temporal and spatial flow variability in the
river network.
4. The allocation solutions developed by a river
bankruptcy optimization model are expected to
satisfy the composition properties suggested by Ansink
and Weikard (2013) for river bankruptcy problems.
Nonetheless, composition properties have not been
used in this study to derive the bankruptcy solutions.

Figure
1. Schematic
map
of aoftransboundary
river network.
Figure1.
Schematic
map
a trans-boundary
river network

fixed allocation rule can provide acceptable allocations that
are insensitive to hydrologic variability.

3 River bankruptcy allocation models
Figure 1 shows a schematic of simple transboundary river
system with multiple tributaries, a lake (sink) at the outlet
and m riparians (i = 1, 2, . . . , m), each having different types
of water demand (e.g., domestic, agricultural, and environmental). Water bankruptcy occurs when the total demand of
the riparians exceeds the stock of water. Bankruptcy rules
can be applied to allocate the available water to the riparians
with respect to their water demands (claims). In river systems, however, the classic bankruptcy rules might produce
infeasible allocation results due to spatial and temporal flow
variability and water access heterogeneity. Thus, bankruptcy
rules must be modified to account for the physical characteristics of the river network. We propose developing non-linear
network flow optimization models that facilitate application
of four commonly used bankruptcy methods, namely proportional (P), adjusted proportional (AP), constrained equal
award (CEA), and constrained equal loss (CEL) rules to river
bankruptcy problems, with respect to the water availability
constraints. These models have the following general characteristics:
1. Each bankruptcy optimization model is based on a specific bankruptcy rule.
2. An allocation solution developed by a river bankruptcy
optimization model is always unique.
3. The allocation solution set developed by a bankruptcy
optimization model is always feasible, considering
www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci.net/18/3055/2014/

5. The bankruptcy optimization models seek “equal treatment of the equals” to the extent possible. This means
that the bankruptcy optimization models minimize
hydro-hegemony (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006) in the system by equal treatment of all riparians regardless of
their location in the system (upstream vs. downstream)
and level of contribution to the total flows. This characteristic makes the proposed framework different in
essence from the methods proposed by Ansink and
Weikard (2012) and Mianabadi et al. (2013).
6. In the absence of water availability restrictions, a
bankruptcy optimization model based on a given
bankruptcy rule produces allocation results that
are identical to allocation solutions based on that
bankruptcy rule. In other words, when allocation
based on a given bankruptcy rule is feasible, original
bankruptcy solutions match the solutions produced by
the corresponding bankruptcy optimization model.
7. In presence of water availability restrictions (when the
application of original bankruptcy solutions methods infeasible allocation solutions), bankruptcy optimization
models minimize the difference between their allocation
solutions and the solutions based on the corresponding
original bankruptcy rules.
8. Water allocations to riparians with equal claims are not
necessarily equal in river bankruptcy problems, due to
the uneven access to water along the river system.
9. A bankruptcy optimization model can be applied to any
river network, irrespective of its physical characteristics
(shape, number of tributaries, number of riparians, etc.).
10. Each river bankruptcy optimization model satisfies the
following initial, mass balance (flow continuity), and
non-negativity constraints:
Ti,t = Ii,t + Oi−1,t ∀i,
Oi,t = Ti,t − Si,t ∀i,
O0,t = 0,
Om,t = Dt ,

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 18, 3055–3068, 2014

3060

K. Madani et al.: Resolving conflicts over transboundary rivers using bankruptcy methods

Si,t ≥ 0 ∀i,
Si,t ≤ Ti,t ∀i,
m
X
Si,t ≤ Et ,

(5)
(6)
(7)

i=1

Et =

m
X

Ii,t − Dt ,

(8)

i=1

where for i = 1, 2, . . . , m in a given time step t: Ti,t is
the total available water in riparian i’s territory (decision
variable); Ii,t is the riparian i’s contribution to the river
system through the tributaries originating in its territory
(known variable); Oi,t is the total outflow from riparian i to the downstream riparian state (i + 1) (decision
variable); Si,t is the allocated water supply to riparian
i in each month (decision variable); Dt is the sink demand at the system’s outlet (known variable); and Et is
the total asset water (available water) to be shared in the
bankruptcy problem.
While the sink node at the system’s outlet can be treated
as a riparian, here we assume that the environmental
need of the sink has a high priority. Therefore, Eq. (4)
ensures that the lake’s environmental demand is fully
met.
11. A bankruptcy optimization model is only appropriate
for a bankrupt river system in which the total demand
exceeds the total available water. This makes Et ≤
m
P
Ci,t a necessary condition for validity of the optii=1

mization model, where Ci,t is the claim (demand) of riparian i in time step t (known variable).
12. The amount of water allocated to a riparian party i (by a
river bankruptcy optimization model) never exceeds its
claim/demand. Thus, all bankruptcy optimization models satisfy the following constraint:
Si,t ≤ Ci,t ∀i,

(9)

In the case of downstream excess flow, i.e., when water availability is more than the claim of the downstream riparian, this riparian must be excluded from the
river bankruptcy problem, as technically this riparian
is not expected to be subject to any conflict of water
allocation.
Sections 3.1–3.4 present the mathematical formulations
for each of the proposed river network bankruptcy optimization models. All river bankruptcy optimization models are
subject to Eqs. (1)–(9). One advantage of using a network
bankruptcy model is that it can be applied to any river network with any shape. Thus, the river network should not
necessarily match the natural river system and it can include
water diversion/transfer infrastructure (already developed or
under consideration during allocation negotiations). It must
Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 18, 3055–3068, 2014

be noted that while the proposed models have been developed for river networks, they are generally applicable to any
network bankruptcy problem in which the agents’ accessibility to the resource can be determined based on the network
structure.
Given the time sensitivity of water deliveries, water solutions must be found using an appropriate time-step to prevent
disruption in water deliveries to any riparian party. In systems without enough storage capacity to regulate and carry
over water, smaller time-steps (e.g., months) can be used as
the basis of allocations. In this case, allocations are time specific and can be done for each time-step independently, i.e.,
the bankruptcy rule is applied to a given time-step (e.g., 1
month) during the planning horizon (e.g., 1 years), based on
the water availability and claims in that month only, regardless of the allocations in other months. In regulated systems,
operations are more flexible. Thus, bankruptcy rules can be
applied to the whole planning horizon
Bankruptcy optimization models in this case is that specific concerns of the riparian parties during the planning
horizon as optimization constraints. Examples of such constraints would be minimum acceptable water supply, minimum environmental flow, minimum reservoir storage/energy
head for hydroelectricity generation, maximum/minimum
temperature, minimum acceptable reliability/resiliency of
water supply, and maximum acceptable vulnerability of water supply at particular points within the river network in a
given time (e.g., day, week, month) during the planning horizon (e.g., year).
In this study, the proposed modeling framework is applied
to an unregulated system for which bankruptcy (cutback) allocation decisions in each time-step are independent from
other time-steps.
3.1

Proportional (P ) rule

The P rule satisfies an equal proportion of the creditors’
claims. Based on this ancient bankruptcy method, the equal
portion (λPi,t ) is calculated by dividing the total available resource by total demand. The P rule’s water allocation optimization model for river systems is proposed in the following
mathematical form:
Minimize λPt −

m
Y

λPi,t ,

(10)

i=1

subject to:
Si,t
∀i,
Ci,t
≤ λPt ∀i,

λPi,t =

(11)

λPi,t

(12)

where for i = 1, 2, . . . , m in a given time step t: λPi,t is the
riparian i’s proportional allocation coefficient (decision variable), and λPt is the maximum proportional allocation coefficient (decision variable). This optimization model tries to
www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci.net/18/3055/2014/
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minimize the latter variable. The second term in the objective function ensures that the model has a unique solution
and the agents’ allocation coefficients (λPi,t ) are as close to
each other as possible. The minimum objective value for a
given problem is achieved when the riparians’ allocation coefficients are equal. In that case, λPt = λPi,t and the proportional allocation coefficients match the proportional cutback
rate under the original bankruptcy rule, which is equal to
Et
. This case occurs when the flow variability does not
m
P

3061

i’s AP allocation coefficient (decision variable), and λAPt is
the maximum AP allocation coefficient (decision variable).
Similar to the P rule’s optimization model, the minimum objective value is achieved when the original bankruptcy solution is feasible and the optimized allocations match the allocations under application of the original bankruptcy rules.
The second term in the objective function ensures having a
unique solution and minimizes the differences between the
allocation coefficients of the riparians.

Ci,t

i=1

make the original bankruptcy rule infeasible.

3.3

3.2

This ancient rule, adopted by rabbinical legislators (Dagan
and Volij, 1993) allocates the minimum of λCEAt and Ci,t to
all beneficiaries, provided that the sum of allocations equals
the total available resource. CEA tries satisfying the lower
claims to the extent possible in order to minimize the number of unsatisfied creditors. This rule is supposed to favor
the lower claims, normally belonging to weaker beneficiaries who can be more affected by losses (Madani and Dinar,
2013). Based on CEA, the initial allocation to all beneficiaries is equal to the lowest claim, provided that the sum of initial allocations does not exceed the demand. The fully satisfied creditor is then excluded and the process continues with
the remaining creditors after updating their unsatisfied claims
as well as the remaining resource value. At any stage (including the initial stage) when allocating an amount equal to the
lowest claim to all remaining creditors is not feasible (due to
insufficiency of remaining resource) the remaining resource
is distributed equally among all remaining creditors.
The mathematical formulation of the CEA rule’s river
bankruptcy optimization model is proposed as follows:

Adjusted proportional rule (AP)

Based on this rule (Curiel et al., 1987), what remains for beneficiary i once all other creditors are satisfied is the basis for
allocation. To determine the initial amount of allocation to
creditor i, the summation of claims of all other beneficiaries
is compared with the available stock of water. In the case of
surplus, the initial allocation to riparian i is equal to the remaining water stock once the demands of all other riparians
are satisfied. Otherwise, the initial allocation to i is set to 0. It
is assumed that the initial allocation calculated through this
procedure is agreeable by all beneficiaries. Once initial allocations are determined, claims are revised. The revised claim
of a given beneficiary is set equal to the minimum of the
remaining water stock and the difference between the beneficiary’s initial claim and its initial allocation. The P rule
is then applied to the remaining water stock and the revised
claims.
The mathematical formulation of the AP rule’s river
bankruptcy optimization model is proposed as follows:
Minimize λAPt −

m
Y

λAPi,t ,

Constrained equal award rule (CEA)

(13)

m
Q

i=1

subject to:
X
Ri,t =
Cj,t ∀i,

Minimize λCEAt −
(14)

j 6=i

Et − Ri,t + |Et − Ri,t |
∀i,
2
= Min(Ci,t , Et ) ∀i,

υi,t =

(15)

∗
Ci,t

(16)

λAPi,t =

Si,t − υi,t
∀i,
∗ −υ
Ci,t
i,t

λAPi,t ≤ λAPt ∀i,
m υ
Et − 6i=1
i,t
λAPt ≤ m
∀i,
∗
6j =1,j 6=i (Cj,t − υj,t )

(17)
(18)
(19)

where for i = 1, 2, . . . , m in a given time step t: Ri,t is the
summation of all riparians’ claims excluding riparian i; υi,t
is the initial allocation to riparian i (amount of water conceded to riparian i by all other riparians); λAPi,t is the riparian
www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci.net/18/3055/2014/

λCEAi,t

i=1

(λCEAt )m−1

,

(20)

subject to:
λCEAi,t = Si,t ∀i,
λCEAi,t ≤ λCEAt ∀i,

(21)
(22)

where for i = 1, 2, . . . , m in a given time step t: λCEAi,t is the
feasible allocation to the riparian i (decision variable), and
λCEAt is the highest feasible allocation to the creditors (decision variable). The second term in the objective function is
to enforce a unique solution and to minimize the difference
between the allocations which would be equal in the absence
of resource accessibility limitations. Given that λCEAt can be
more than 1 (different from the λPt and λAPt which are always less than or equal 1) the second term is divided by a
positive number of comparable magnitude to ensure that the
second term is always smaller than or equal to the first term.
Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 18, 3055–3068, 2014
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Constrained equal loss rule (CEL)

This rule can be viewed as the opposite of CEA, as it gives
priority to satisfying the highest claims (more powerful creditors) first. Once the highest claim is satisfied, the process is
repeated with the remaining resource and creditors. The process stops at any stage (including the first stage) if the available resource is not sufficient to satisfy the highest claim of
the remaining creditors. At this stage, the remaining resource
is split equally among the remaining creditors. By doing this,
CEL allocates Ci − λCELi to all beneficiaries whose claims
are bigger than λCELt , allocating 0 to those who do not fall in
this category. Thus, the final allocation to each beneficiary is
equal to max 0, Ci − λCELi .
The CEL rule’s river bankruptcy optimization model is
proposed as follows:
m
Q

Minimize λCELt −

Figure 2. Qezelozan-Sefidrud river system and its eight riparian
provinces.

λCELi,t

i=1

(λCELt )m−1

,

(23)

subject to:
λCELi,t = Ci,t − Si,t ∀i,
λCELi,t ≤ λCELt ∀i,

(24)
(25)

where for i = 1, 2, . . . , m in a given time step t: λCELi,t is the
unmet claim of the riparian i (decision variable), and λCELt
is the maximum unmet claim of all riparians (decision variable).
4

Example: the Qezelozan-Sefidrud river
system bankruptcy problem

The proposed framework is applied to develop bankruptcybased water allocation schemes for resolving a real-world
transboundary river conflict in Iran. The Qezelozan-Sefidrud
river basin (Fig. 2) is located at the intersection of the Iran’s
Alborz and Zagros mountain ranges, with an area about
59 400 km2 , making it the largest basin of the nation. The
basin overlaps with eight provinces (Kurdistan, Hamadan,
Zanjan, Eastern Azerbaijan, Ardebil, Tehran, Qazvin, and
Gilan) and the river provides the basis for important economic activities in these provinces. The river eventually
flows into the Caspian Sea in north of Iran, which is the
largest enclosed body of water in the world and the source
of more than 90 % of the world’s caviar supply (Madani
et al., 2014b). Supplying the required environmental flows
of the Caspian Sea is essential to the health of its valuable
ecosystem.
The study basin is not international. Nevertheless, interprovincial or interstate basins are effectively equivalent to
international basins as long as their boundaries do not match
political boundaries and they are managed by more than one
authority. The Qezelozan-Sefidrud river system is an example of a transboundary river basin, in which serious conflict
Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 18, 3055–3068, 2014

has arisen as a result of recent socioeconomic (i.e., population increase and development), political (i.e., changes
in the water resources management structure), and hydrologic/climatic (i.e., frequent droughts) changes. As a result
of political changes in the country, the Qezelozan-Sefidrud
river system, which was historically shared by six Iranian
provinces and managed by only one water management authority, is now shared by eight provinces and managed by
eight water authorities. As a result of population increase and
development in the region, each province is trying to increase
its share from the river and minimize the outgoing flow, resulting in significant reduction of water flowing into downstream provinces. To increase their uses from the river, the
upstream provinces have aggressive water resources development plans. These development plans include construction
of multiple new reservoirs, which are currently under construction or in the study phase. Complete implementation of
these plans will negatively impact the downstream provinces,
which historically have had more access to the river system
due to their stronger political and economic power as well as
higher populations. Therefore, the political tension has increased in the basin, making the Qezelozan-Sefidrud river
system the subject of one of the most intractable conflicts
over water resources in Iran. To show the utility of the proposed model in solving transboundary water allocation conflicts, the proposed framework is applied to derive new water
allocation schemes for the Qezelozan-Sefidrud river system.
The first step in solving river bankruptcy problems is determining the legitimate claims of the riparian parties. This
step is challenging in unregulated systems without established water rights. We propose three alternatives for determining the claims of the riparian parties in the example case.
These alternatives, which help setting the upper and lower
boundaries of the claims include:
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Figure 3. Estimated monthly claims of the riparian provinces based on the three proposed claim calculation methods.
Figure 3. Estimated monthly claims of the riparian provinces based on the three proposed claim
calculation method

1. Historical uses: based on this alternative, historical uses
of the river system, revealed by the historical water use
data are set as the claims of the riparians. The water use
values are calculated based on the difference between
the recorded inflows and outflows of each province at
the hydrometric stations. This alternative sets the lower
claim boundary for each riparian.
2. Planned uses: Iran is currently the world’s third dam
builder with respect to the dams it has under construction (Madani, 2014). Several water storage projects are
under development at different locations in the riparian states of the Qezelozan-Sefidrud river system. These
projects have been approved by the central government,
and are receiving financial support from the central and
provincial governments. Each project has an associated
estimation of sectoral water demands (i.e., domestic,
agricultural, industrial, and environmental) used for the
calculation of the required storage capacity. Based on
www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci.net/18/3055/2014/

this alternative, the total claim of each riparian is set
equal to the total documented water demands of different river system-related reservoirs within the watershed
boundaries, which are already in operation or under development.
3. Future uses: beside projects under construction, each riparian state has plans for getting approval for constructing additional water storage infrastructure to meet its
increasing water demand as a result of development.
Based on this claim estimation alternative, water demands of these additional facilities will be added to the
water claims calculated based on alternative 2 only if
the construction plans of these facilities have been publicly announced. This alternative sets the upper claim
boundary for each riparian.
Figure 3 indicates the estimated monthly water claims of the
riparian states of the Qezelozan-Sefidrud river system based
Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 18, 3055–3068, 2014
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Figure 5. Total monthly claims (including Caspian Sea’s water demand) based on three different
ter demand) based on three different claim estimation methods and
claim estimation methods and total annual water yield under normal and dry hydrologies

on the three proposed methods. Detailed calculations of the
water claims based on proposed claim determination alternatives can be found in Zarezadeh (2011).
Given that allocation solutions can be sensitive to climatic/hydrologic conditions, three different water availability scenarios, representing three distinct hydrologic conditions, normal (average), dry, and wet, were initially considered for solving the example river bankruptcy problem.
In the normal scenario, river flows are based on the average monthly river discharges during the 1956–2006 period.
Dry scenario flows match the average monthly river discharges during the major drought of 1998–2001 in the region. The wet scenario flows are based on the monthly flows
during the 1968–1969 period. The annual river discharge under the wet scenario will be sufficient to meet the historical,
planned, and future claims of the riparian states as well as
the Caspian Sea’s (sink) water demand (Fig. 4). Therefore,
river bankruptcy problem is solved only for the normal and
dry cases.
Due to the unclear status of water rights/claims and the
future status of reservoir networks in the Qezelozan-Sefidrud
river system, this system is considered to be unregulated, disregarding the possible benefits resulting from coordination
of reservoir operation strategies in the basin. The problem
is solved using a monthly time-step and allocations are determined in each time-step separately. Under this approach,
the total allocation to each riparian over the whole planning
horizon (e.g., one year) is the summation of bankruptcy allocations in the existing time-steps within the planning horizon
(e.g., twelve months).
Figure 5 indicates the monthly water yield of the
Qezelozan-Sefidrud river system under the normal and dry
conditions as well as the total monthly claims of the riparian
parties (including the Caspian Sea’s water demand). This figure clearly shows the water bankruptcy status of the example
river system for almost half of the year, especially in warmer
months with higher agricultural water demands.
The four proposed bankruptcy optimization models in
Section 3 were run under two hydrologic scenarios to calculate bankruptcy allocations under normal and dry conditions.
The models were first run on a monthly basis to calculate the

monthly allocations. The summation of 12 monthly allocations based on each model with a given set of claims under
a given hydrology determines the corresponding annual allocation of each province. The annual bankruptcy allocations
based on different bankruptcy models, claims, and hydrologies are presented in Fig. 6.
As expected based on the definition, the CEL method favors the creditor with the highest claim (in this case, the
downstream Province of Gilan). The opposite is true for the
CEA method which gives priority to satisfy the claims of the
creditors with lower claims (in this case, the provinces upstream of Gilan). The AP and P methods can be considered
as moderate allocation methods which result in allocations
that are between the high and low allocations estimated by
the other two methods. In comparison with P , the AP method
allocates a higher share to the parties with lower claims and
a lower share to the parties with higher claims, trying to address the bias toward higher claims in the P method. The
difference between the allocation values for different claims
and hydrologies underline the sensitivity of bankruptcy allocation schemes to the difference in claim values and hydrologic conditions.

Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 18, 3055–3068, 2014

total annual water yield under normal and dry hydrologies.

5

Stability evaluation

The suggested bankruptcy optimization models provide different allocation solutions, based on various notions of fairness. Therefore, their acceptability is always questionable,
given that there is always at least one beneficiary who finds
one of the given alternatives unfair because they can gain
more under another rule (Madani and Lund, 2011). As one
of the most commonly used social choice (voting) methods (Sheikhmohammady and Madani, 2008; Madani et al.,
2014c), the plurality index can be considered as an indicator of potential acceptability of a decision rule in multiparticipant decision-making problems. Based on this index,
the number of stakeholders who prefer one method to the
others is simply an indicator of the degree of acceptance of
that method (Dinar and Howitt, 1997).

www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci.net/18/3055/2014/
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Table 1. Plurality index of different bankruptcy solutions for different claims and hydrologies.
Hydrology
Claim

Historical
Planned
Future

Normal

Dry

P

AP

CEL

CEA

Winner

P

AP

CEL

CEA

0
0
0

0
0
1

1
1
1

6
6
6

CEA
CEA
CEA

0
0
0

0
1
2

1
1
1

6
5
5

The higher the allocation to a riparian state, the more preferred the allocation rule (bankruptcy method) by that state.
Table 1 shows the plurality index (number of votes received)
of each bankruptcy solution method for different claim values under different hydrologies. The assumption is that each
party selects the allocation scheme that gives it the highest
share. Given that the Hamadan Province has no historical or
planned claim, its vote is only counted when future claims are
considered. Based on the plurality index, the CEA method,
which highly satisfies the riparians with lower claims (majority in this case) in both normal and dry conditions, is the
winner. However, given the absolute objection of the most
powerful province, i.e., Gilan, to this method, which allocates low shares to this province, this solution is not practical
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Winner
CEA
CEA
CEA

without strong intervention of the central government or providing strong cooperation incentives to Gilan.
The majority does not necessarily win in multi-participant
decision-making problems with asymmetric powers, especially when the minority group is powerful. Therefore,
the plurality index might not be appropriate for identifying the feasible solution when there is a power imbalance
among the beneficiaries. Other methods can be used to quantify the potential acceptability of allocation solutions (Read
et al., 2014). Loehman et al. (1979) used the following
power index (αi ), originally developed by Shapley and Shubik (1954), to evaluate the power of players in cooperative game theory problems in which players seek the best
method for allocating the incremental benefits of cooperation
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Table 2. Bankruptcy allocation stability index (BASI) values of different bankruptcy solutions for different claims and hydrologies.
BASI
Scenario

Historical
Planned
Future

Normal

Dry

P

AP

CEL

CEA

P

AP

CEL

CEA

0.11
0.31
6.57

0.10
0.31
6.49

0.07
0.21
3.48

0.15
0.43
9.65

0.90
1.11
1.01

1.00
1.01
0.95

1.33
1.68
1.54

1.27
0.77
0.73

to coalition members:
X
xi − xi0
αi = P
iN,
αi = 1,
0
(xj − xj )
iN

(26)

j N

where xi is the allocated cooperative benefit share to player
0
i, xi is the status quo (non-cooperative) gain of player i, and
N is the set of all players.
A high power index value reflects less power or a higher
willingness to cooperate. A stable allocation solution can
be achieved when power is distributed more or less equally
among the players (Dinar and Howitt, 1997). Therefore, the
coefficient of variation of powers, also known as the stability
index (Sα ) is used as an indicator of the stability of allocation
solutions:
σα
Sα =
,
(27)
α
where σα is the standard deviation of powers and α is the
mean power. The lower the index, the more stable the allocation solution.
Given that cooperation in bankruptcy problems does not
have incremental benefits and parties’ gains are zero in
the status quo, the power index is not readily quantifiable
in bankruptcy problems. Therefore, we propose a modified
power index (BPI) for bankruptcy problems as follows:
X
Si − υi
BPIi = P
iN,
BPIi = 1,
(Sj − υj )
iN

(28)

j N

used to evaluate the potential acceptability of a bankruptcy
solution:
σBPI
BASI =
,
(31)
BPI
where σBPI is the standard deviation of riparian powers and
BPI is the mean power. The higher the index, the less stable
the allocation solution.
Table 2 shows the BASI value for each bankruptcy solution under a given hydrology for a unique claim set. Based
on this table, the CEL method is the most stable method under the normal hydrology even though this method is not the
most popular method (based on the popularity index). Given
that stability (feasibility) is more important than popularity
(social optimality) in conflict resolution (Read et al., 2014)
we can conclude that CEL is the best mechanism for water
allocation in this bankruptcy example. Nevertheless, the stability of CEL is sensitive to hydrological conditions and this
method becomes the least stable allocation method under the
dry conditions. Under the dry hydrology, the P rule is the
most stable with lower demands. As demands increase, the
CEA method (the most popular method) becomes more stable. The changes in stability of allocation rule, with changes
in demand and hydrology show that the stability of allocation mechanisms is sensitive to both the hydrologic conditions (water availability) and the claim set characteristics.
Future studies can focus on understanding the correlations of
the BASI of allocation rules with the claim set characteristics
(magnitude of claims, heterogeneity of claims, etc.) and the
resource availability conditions.

where:
Si =

n
X

Si,t ,

(29)

t=1

υi =

n
X

υi,t ,

(30)

t=1

BPIi is the bankruptcy power index (BPI) of riparian i, υi
is the sum of the conceded water to riparian i by all other
riparians in all time-steps in the overall planning horizon, N
is the set of riparians, and n is the number of time-steps in
the planning horizon (n = 12 months in the study example).
The bankruptcy allocation stability index (BASI) is then
equal to the coefficient of variation of BPIs, which can be
Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 18, 3055–3068, 2014
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Conclusions

This work formed the basis and set practical guidelines for
developing allocation schemes for resolving transboundary
water allocation conflicts based using bankruptcy methods.
Although the suggested approach does not necessarily maximize the total welfare in the basin and might result in suboptimal allocations from an economic standpoint, it can be
used to develop practical solutions when side payments are
not feasible, parties are not highly cooperative (or not interested in implementing solutions based on conventional cooperative game theory solutions), and utility information is not
available or reliable.
www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci.net/18/3055/2014/
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Considering the non-uniform spatial and temporal variability of water flows, resulting in unequal access to water in
river systems, non-linear optimization models were proposed
for solving river bankruptcy problems. Four river bankruptcy
network flow optimization models were developed based on
four conventional bankruptcy rules, i.e., proportional (P), adjusted proportional (AP), constrained equal award (CEA),
and constrained equal loss (CEL), for transboundary water
allocation. The models can be applied to any river network
(or bankruptcy network) problem, irrespective of its shape
and resource variability/accessibility conditions.
Acknowledging the difference in the notion of fairness
and the possibility of the rejection of suggested allocations
by the beneficiaries, who find certain allocation rules unfair, there is a need for evaluating the acceptability of different bankruptcy solutions. While popularity of each solution is a simple indicator of its potential acceptability, it was
argued that in the case of asymmetric powers, the majority
cannot necessary determine the feasible solution, especially
when powerful parties do not support the most popular solution. Therefore, a new index (bankruptcy allocation stability index (BASI)) was formulated for evaluating the potential acceptability/stability of allocation solutions with respect to the distribution of claims and dissatisfaction among
the beneficiaries.
The evaluation of the stability of different bankruptcy allocation solutions for different water demand and hydrologic
scenarios in the example case suggested that acceptability
is sensitive to both water demand (claim) and water availability. This finding has a significant policy implication for
transboundary water management, suggesting that inflexible
water allocation agreements and treaties that have been developed based on stationary assumptions are not resilient,
especially in face of expected socioeconomic and climatic
changes.
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